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“A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”:  
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication†
Ruth Bader Ginsburg††
In any season, it would be an honor to speak as a Sir David Williams 
Lecturer.  But no season could be better for me than this one.  For my 
daughter, Jane Ginsburg, is here at Cambridge, thriving in her year in the 
Arthur Goodhart Visiting Chair, thoroughly enjoying her affiliation with the 
law faculty and Emmanuel College, Sir David’s College (from 1627 to 
1631, John Harvard’s too).   
I did not know it at the time, but Sir David and I attended Harvard 
Law School the same school year, 1957–1958.  He came East from gradu-
ate studies at the University of California in Berkeley to complete his Hark-
ness Fellowship at Cambridge cross the sea.  He was in a graduate program, 
I was a lowly 2L.   
Sir David has done so much good in his various occupations—as lead-
ing scholar and author in the fields of administrative and constitutional law, 
guest lecturer around the world, true public citizen serving on many impor-
tant commissions and councils, Vice Chancellor at this great University for 
seven years.  Several of my colleagues have benefited from their associa-
tion with him.  Charles Wright, Frank Wozencraft, and Malcolm Wilkey had 
fellowships at Wolfson when Sir David was President of that College.  Jus-
tices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy participated with him in 
the Anglo-American Legal Exchange.  A few more shared connections: 
Both Sir David and I are members of the American Law Institute, also the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and honorary members of Lin-
coln’s Inn. 
When Sir David spoke at the American Law Institute’s annual dinner 
15 years ago, the then-President of the Institute, Rod Perkins, did consider-
able homework to prepare his introduction.  Rod told us that Sir David grew 
up in West Wales, in a pre-Roman town that is not only his birthplace, it is 
† Sir David Williams Lecture delivered on May 9, 2005 at Emmanuel College in Cambridge.  An 
earlier version of the address is published in the Proceedings of the 99th Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law. 
†† Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. 
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also believed to be the birthplace of Merlin, renowned magician at King 
Arthur’s Court.  As an attendee at that 1990 event, I can tell you that, even 
after a convivial cocktail hour, and wine of acceptable quality flowing 
freely at dinner, Sir David’s talk captivated the audience.  I selected the 
subject of this evening’s remarks with his parting words at the ALI gather-
ing in mind.  Sir David celebrated our joint Anglo-American heritage and 
said he was convinced jurists in Europe, and especially in the United King-
dom, must take account of the experience of the United States over the two 
centuries (and now more) since our separation from the mother country.  I 
will turn the table round and speak of the growing appreciation among U.S. 
jurists that we must take account of experience, good thinking, and judicial 
opinions beyond our borders. 
The Old Testament Book of Deuteronomy famously instructs: “Justice, 
justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive.”1  My remarks center on one 
aspect of that pursuit in the system in which I work: judicial review for con-
stitutionality as it is practiced in the United States.  What impact, if any, 
international and foreign opinions should have on decisionmaking in U.S. 
courts has proved controversial.  Recognizing the controversy, I will en-
deavor to explain my view, which is simply this: If U.S. experience and 
decisions can be instructive to systems that have more recently instituted or 
invigorated judicial review for constitutionality, so we can learn from others 
now engaged in measuring ordinary laws and executive actions against 
charters securing basic rights. 
Exposing laws to judicial review for constitutionality was once un-
common outside the United States.  In the United Kingdom, not distant 
from France, Spain, Germany, and other civil law countries in this regard, 
court review of legislation for compatibility with a fundamental charter was 
considered off limits, irreconcilable with the doctrine of parliamentary su-
premacy.  But particularly in the years following World War II, many na-
tions installed constitutional review by courts as one safeguard against op-
pressive government and stirred-up majorities.  National, multinational, and 
international human rights charters and courts today play a prominent part 
in our world.  The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer, I believe, if we 
do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with 
values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own. 
Very much the same opinion was several times expressed by the Chief 
Justice of the United States, William H. Rehnquist, who put it this way in a 
1999 Foreword to a collection of essays on comparative constitutional law: 
[F]or nearly a century and a half, courts of the United States exercis-
ing the power of judicial review [for constitutionality] had no prece-
1 Deuteronomy 16:20 (“Zedek, zedek tirdof, l’maan tichyeh.”). 
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dents to turn to except their own, because our Court alone exercised 
this sort of authority.  When many new constitutional courts were cre-
ated after the Second World War, these courts naturally looked to deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States, among other sources, 
for developing their own law.  But now that constitutional law is sol-
idly grounded in so many countries . . . it [is] time the U.S. courts be-
gan looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in 
their own deliberative process.2
More recently, I must acknowledge, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed 
skepticism, if not downright disagreement, on the relevance of foreign law, 
both on human rights issues and on federalism questions—issues implicat-
ing the allocation of regulatory and decisionmaking authority between 
States and Nation in the United States.  I will later refer to 21st-century 
dissenting opinions he joined criticizing comparative sideglances by the 
Court’s majority.  I note here, in contrast to recent misgivings, the view 
Justice Felix Frankfurter expressed half a century ago.  Even on questions 
of federalism, he thought, an “island” or “lone ranger” mentality ought not 
prevail.  Justice Frankfurter wrote: 
While the distribution of powers between each national government 
and its parts varies, leading at times to different legal results, the prob-
lems faced by the United States Supreme Court under the Commerce 
Clause are not different in kind . . . from those which come before the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia.3
Were he with us today, Justice Frankfurter might have included the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. 
Returning to my own perspective, while U.S. jurisprudence has 
evolved over the course of two centuries of constitutional adjudication, we 
are not so wise that we have nothing to learn from other democratic legal 
systems newer to judicial review for constitutionality.  The point was well 
made by Judge Guido Calabresi, a former Dean of Yale Law School and 
now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (one of 
thirteen appellate courts in the U.S. federal court system).  “Wise parents,” 
Judge Calabresi said in a 1995 concurring opinion, “do not hesitate to learn 
from their children.”4
2
  William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, at viii (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, eds., 2002) (The foreword is based on an edited tran-
script of introductory comments delivered at the conference “Comparative Constitutional Law: Defining 
the Field,” held at Georgetown University Law Center on September 17, 1999.).   
3
 FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 39 (1956). 
4
 United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing ap-
proach taken by German and Italian constitutional courts to interpretation of vague statutory language in 
light of changed circumstances). 
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In the value I place on comparative dialogue—on sharing with and 
learning from others—I am inspired by counsel from the founders of the 
United States.  The drafters and signers of the Declaration of Independence 
cared about the opinions of other peoples; they placed before the world the 
reasons why the States, joining together to become the United States of 
America, were impelled to separate from Great Britain.  The Declarants 
stated their reasons out of “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind.”5
I should add, even in this audience, that the U.S. Declaration then endeav-
ored, through a long list of grievances, to submit the “Facts”—the “long 
Train of [the British Crown’s] Abuses”—to the scrutiny of “a candid 
World.”6
The U.S. Supreme Court, early on, expressed a complementary view: 
The judicial power of the United States, the Court said in 1816, was in-
tended to include cases “in the correct adjudication of which foreign nations 
are deeply interested . . . [and] in which the principles of the law and comity 
of nations often form an essential inquiry.”7  “Far from [exhibiting hostility] 
to foreign countries’ views and laws,” Professor Vicki Jackson of the 
Georgetown University law faculty wrote last year, “the founding genera-
tion showed concern for how adjudication in our courts would affect other 
countries’ regard for the United States.”8  Even more so today, the United 
States is subject to the scrutiny of “a candid World.”  What the United 
States does, for good or for ill, continues to be watched by the international 
community, in particular, by organizations concerned with the advancement 
of the “rule of law” and respect for human dignity. 
The new turn-of-the-nineteenth-century United States looked outward 
not only to earn the respect of other nations.  In writing the Constitution, the 
Framers were inspired by jurists and philosophers from other lands, and 
they understood that the new nation would be bound by “the Law of Na-
tions,” today called international law.  Among powers granted the U.S. 
Congress, the Framers enumerated in Article I the power “[t]o define and 
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations.”9
John Jay, one of the authors of The Federalist Papers promoting ratifi-
cation of the U.S. Constitution, and George Washington’s appointee as first 
Chief Justice of the United States, wrote in 1793 that the United States, “by 
taking a place among the nations of the earth, [had] become amenable to the 
5
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
6
 Id. at para. 2. 
7
 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816).   
8
 Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk with You, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 44.  See 
also Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on H.R. 
Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 14 (2004) (statement of Professor Vicki C. Jackson) [hereinafter Jackson Statement].   
9
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.   
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laws of nations.”10  Eleven years later, the great Chief Justice John Marshall 
(who no doubt had read Blackstone on this matter) cautioned that “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any 
other possible construction remains.”11  And in 1900, the Court famously 
reaffirmed in The Paquete Habana that  
[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice . . . . [W]here there is no treaty, and 
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort 
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .12
There are generations-old and still persistent discordant views, I ac-
knowledge, on recourse to the “Opinions of Mankind.”  A mid-19th century 
U.S. Chief Justice expressed opposition to such recourse in an extreme 
statement.  He wrote: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or 
feeling . . . in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should 
induce the [U.S. Supreme Court] to give to the words of the Constitu-
tion a more liberal construction . . . than they were intended to bear 
when the instrument was framed and adopted.13
Those words were penned in 1857.  They appear in Chief Justice Roger 
Taney’s opinion for a divided Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, an opinion 
that invoked the majestic Due Process Clause to uphold one human’s right 
to hold another in bondage.  The Dred Scott decision declared that no “de-
scendan[t] of Africans [imported into the United States], and sold as [a] 
slav[e]” could ever become a citizen of the United States.14
While the Civil War and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments reversed that judgment, U.S. jurists and political actors today 
are hardly of one mind on the propriety of looking beyond our nation’s bor-
ders, particularly on matters touching fundamental human rights.  Some 
have expressed spirited opposition.  Justice Scalia wrote this year, in a dis-
senting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas: 
“The Court . . . should cease putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the 
reasoned basis of its decisions.  To invoke alien law when it agrees with 
one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmak-
ing, but sophistry.”15
10
 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793). 
11
 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
12
 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
13
 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857). 
14
 Id. at 403.   
15
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, __; 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1228 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original removed).   
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Another trenchant critic, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, commented last year: “To cite foreign law 
as authority is to flirt with the discredited . . . idea of a universal natural 
law; or to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, 
elite community of wisdom and conscience.”16  Judge Posner’s view rests, 
in part, on the concern that U.S. judges do not comprehend the social, his-
torical, political, and institutional background from which foreign opinions 
emerge.  Nor do we even understand the language in which laws and judg-
ments, outside the common law realm, are written. 
Judge Posner is right, of course, to this extent: Foreign opinions are 
not authoritative; they set no binding precedent for the U.S. judge.  But they 
can add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying ques-
tions.  As to our ignorance of foreign legal systems, just as lawyers can 
learn from each other in multinational transactions and bar associations, 
judges, too, can profit from exchanges and associations with jurists else-
where.  Yes, we should approach foreign legal materials with sensitivity to 
our differences, deficiencies, and imperfect understanding, but imperfec-
tion, I believe, should not lead us to abandon the effort to learn what we can 
from the experience and good thinking foreign sources may convey.17
Somewhat more accommodating, Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in remarks made last fall 
at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London: “[L]imited references 
to foreign legal authorities may play a beneficial role in contemporary 
American jurisprudence.”  But, he continued, “courts in the United States 
should restrict the use of foreign legal authorities to certain well-defined 
categories of cases”: when treaties or international conventions are relevant, 
first and foremost, and also when “Congress has expressed a desire to bring 
the United States into alignment with the international community.”18
Judge O’Scannlain gave as examples of proper regard for foreign deci-
sions and laws two opinions I wrote for the Court.  The first, El Al Israel 
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, relied on a House of Lords’ decision inter-
preting the Warsaw Convention’s limitations on airline liability for injury to a 
passenger;19 the second, Eldred v. Ashcroft, upheld against constitutional 
challenge a statute conforming the U.S. copyright term to the European 
Union’s “life plus seventy years.”20  But overall, Judge O’Scannlain’s pres-
16
 Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 
42. 
17
 Judge Posner acknowledged that decisions elsewhere might have informational value; they 
might be useful, he thought, if they contain persuasive reasoning. 
18
 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the Inter-
pretation of Domestic Law?, Lecture at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (Oct. 11, 2004).   
19
 525 U.S. 155, 173–174 (1999) (citing Sidhu v. British Airways plc, [1997] 1 All E. R. 193).   
20
 537 U.S. 186 (2003).   
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entation placed him in accord with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who cautioned against looking 
abroad when resolving “contentious social issues.”21
More representative of the perspective I share with five of my current 
colleagues, Patricia M. Wald, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit, last year said with characteristic wisdom: “It’s 
hard for me to see that the use of foreign decisional law is an up-or-down 
proposition.  I see it rather as a pool of potential and useful information and 
thought that must be mined with caution and restraint.”22
Many current members of the U.S. Congress would terminate all de-
bate over whether federal courts should refer to foreign or international 
legal materials.  For the most part, they would respond to the question with 
a resounding “No.”  Two identical Resolutions introduced this year, one in 
the U.S. House of Representatives and the other in the Senate, declare that 
“judicial interpretations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the 
United States should not be based . . . on judgments, laws, or pronounce-
ments of foreign institutions unless such [materials] inform an understand-
ing of the original meaning of the Constitution . . . .”23  The House Resolu-
tion has so far garnered support from 54 cosponsors.  Two 2005-proposed 
Acts would do more than “resolve.”  They would positively prohibit federal 
courts, when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, from relying upon any law, 
policy, or other action of a foreign state or international organization, other 
than English constitutional and common law “up to the time of the adoption 
of the [U.S.] Constitution . . . .”24  (Even reference to a Scottish verdict, it 
seems, would be out of order.)  The Acts further provide that any judge who 
refers to the proscribed materials shall be deemed to have committed an 
impeachable offense.     
These measures recycle similar resolutions and bills proposed before 
the 2004 elections in the United States, but never put to a vote.   Although I 
doubt the current measures will garner sufficient votes to pass, it is disqui-
eting that they have attracted sizable support.  And one not-so-small con-
cern—they fuel the irrational fringe.  A recent example.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Marshal alerted Justice O’Connor and me to a February 28, 2005, 
web posting on a “chat” site.  It opened: 
Okay commandoes, here is your first patriotic assignment . . . an easy 
one.  Supreme Court Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor have publicly 
21
 J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 423, 425 (2004). 
22
 Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 439 (2004). 
23
 H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).   
24
 Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, §201, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005); Constitution 
Restoration Act of 2005, §201, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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stated that they use European laws and rulings to decide how to rule 
on American cases. 
This is a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom.  It is 
as much an assault on our liberty as anything ever has been . . . .  If 
you are what you say you are, and NOT armchair patriots, then those 
two justices will not live another week. 
More than two months have passed.  Justice O’Connor, I am happy to re-
port, remains alive and well.  As for me, you can judge for yourself.   
To a large extent, I believe, the critics in Congress and in the media 
misperceive how and why U.S. courts refer to foreign and international 
court decisions.  The Washington Post, for example, worried in a March 25 
editorial “about the implications for liberty and the democratic rights of the 
American people if the courts outsource America’s constitutional tradi-
tion.”25  We refer to decisions rendered abroad, it bears repetition, not as 
controlling authorities, but for their indication, in Judge Wald’s words, of 
“common denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between 
the governors and the governed.”26
Two decisions announced April 26, 2005, confounded those fearful 
about the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of foreign court judgments to inform 
U.S. adjudication.  One case involved a man convicted under a federal gun-
control law.  Once convicted of a serious crime “in any court,” the law pre-
scribed, the former offender could not possess a firearm.27  The defendant 
had been convicted in Japan for gun smuggling.  Did “any court” mean any 
court in the world?  Or should “any court” be read to mean any state or fed-
eral court in the United States?  For good and sufficient reasons, Justice 
Breyer, writing for a majority that included Justice O’Connor and me, con-
fined “any court” to those within our borders.  Justice Scalia was among the 
dissenters.  He would have counted the Japanese conviction.  Justice Breyer 
has been billed as “perhaps the court’s leading advocate of the idea that the 
Supreme Court needs to take greater notice of . . . legal opinions abroad.”28
Justice Scalia, as I earlier noted, takes strong issue with that view.   
A similar division attended the Court’s response to the question 
whether persons involved in a scheme to smuggle cheap liquor from Mary-
land into Canada, thereby evading Canada’s hefty taxes on alcohol, could 
be prosecuted in the United States for wire fraud—using interstate tele-
phone wires to accomplish the scheme.29  Joined by three of my colleagues 
including Justice Breyer, I expressed the dissenting view that enforcement 
25 Outsourcing Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at A18.   
26
 Wald, supra note 22, at 442.   
27
 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. __; 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005).   
28
 The Court is Open for Discussion, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at A12.   
29
 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. __; 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005).   
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of Canada’s customs and tax laws was that country’s prerogative, not ours.  
Both cases concerned the territorial range of U.S. laws.  Recognizing that 
the legislature ordinarily thinks domestically is entirely compatible with the 
view that all involved in writing and interpreting laws would profit from 
knowledge of other systems’ approaches and solutions to similar problems. 
Professor Vicki Jackson noted a point critics of comparative 
sideglances perhaps overlook: the “negative authority” foreign experience 
may sometimes have.30  She referred in this regard to the “Steel Seizure 
Case.”31  There, Justice Jackson, in his separate opinion, pointed to features 
of the Weimar Constitution in Germany that allowed Adolf Hitler to assume 
dictatorial powers.  He contrasted Germany’s situation with that of France 
and Great Britain, countries in which legislative authorization was required 
for the exercise of emergency powers.  Justice Jackson drew from that 
comparison support for the conclusion that, without more specific congres-
sional authorization, the U.S. President could not seize private property 
even in aid of a war effort. 
The U.S. Constitution, Justice Scalia has noted, does not contain any 
instruction resembling South Africa’s prescription.  That nation’s Constitu-
tion provides that courts, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, must con-
sider international law, and may consider foreign law.  Other post-World 
War II Constitutions, India’s and Spain’s, for example, have similar pre-
scriptions.   
I would demur to Justice Scalia’s observation.  Judges in the United 
States are free to consult all manner of commentary—Restatements, Trea-
tises, what law professors or even law students write copiously in law re-
views, for example.  If we can consult those writings, why not the analysis 
of a question similar to the one we confront contained in an opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the 
German Constitutional Court, or the European Court of Human Rights?  
Israel’s Chief Justice, Aharon Barak, had it right, I think, when he listed 
among questions on which comparative law inquiry could prove enlighten-
ing or valuable in a positive or negative sense: hate speech, privacy, abor-
tion, the death penalty, and now the fight against terrorism.   
A case in point well-known to this audience.  On December 16, 2004, 
in a controversy precipitated by the fight against terrorism, the Lords of 
Appeal issued a waypaving decision, one that looks beyond the United 
Kingdom’s borders.32  The case was brought by aliens held in custody in 
Belmarsh prison.  A nine-member panel ruled, 8-to-1, that the British gov-
ernment’s indefinite detention of foreigners suspected of terrorism, without 
30
 Jackson Statement, supra note 8, at 15.   
31
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).   
32
 A (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56. 
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charging or trying them, is incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights, incorporated into domestic law by the U.K. Human Rights 
Act.  Lord Bingham’s lead opinion draws not only on domestic decisions 
and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.  It also refers to 
opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada and U.S. federal court opinions.  
Finding the differential treatment of nationals and non-nationals impermis-
sible under the Human Rights Act, Lord Bingham also referred to several 
U.N. instruments, commencing with the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and including the 1965 International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.33
Other opinions too, in that noteworthy decision, contain comparative 
references.  One example: Baroness Hale, after noting that “Belmarsh is not 
the British Guantanamo Bay,” quoted a passage on the protection of minor-
ity rights from Thomas Jefferson’s first inaugural address.34  Lord Bingham 
did make the observation, gently, that contemporary “U.S. authority does 
not provide evidence of general international practice.”35  That comment 
may have figured in the New York Times’ characterization of the Lords’ 
ruling as “a strong example of the increasing interdependence of domestic 
and international law, at least outside of the United States.”36  U.S. District 
Judge Louis H. Pollak, formerly dean of Yale Law School and later, of the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law, in a February 2005 address at 
the Inner Temple, called the Belmarsh decision “masterful.”  The Law 
Lords, he said, “spoke in a firmer voice” than the U.S. Supreme Court has 
up to now on the detention of alleged terrorists without charges or trial.37
The notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United 
States in grappling with hard questions, I earlier suggested, has a close kin-
ship to the view of the U.S. Constitution as a document essentially frozen in 
time as of the date of its ratification.  I am not a partisan of that view.  U.S. 
jurists honor the Framers’ intent “to create a more perfect Union,” I believe, 
if they read the Constitution as belonging to a global 21st century, not as 
fixed forever by 18th-century understandings. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., made the point felicitously in a 
case decided in 1920, Missouri v. Holland, involving the treaty-making 
power.38  “[W]hen we are dealing with words . . . [in] the Constitution of the 
United States,” Holmes wrote, “we must realize that they have called into 
33
 Id. at 35–40, ¶¶ 58–62 (opinion of Lord Bingham).   
34
 Id. at 96, ¶ 223, 100, ¶ 237 (opinion of Baroness Hale).    
35
 Id. at 47, ¶ 69 (opinion of Lord Bingham).   
36
 Lizette Alvarez, British Court Says Detentions Violate Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at 
A1. 
37
 Louis H. Pollak, Our New Supreme Court: Any Lessons from the US?, Seminar Jointly Spon-
sored by the Constitutional and Administrative Law Bar Association and University College London 
(Feb. 23, 2005). 
38
 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
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life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen com-
pletely by the most gifted of its begetters . . . .  The case before us must be 
considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of 
what was said a hundred years ago.”39
A key 1958 plurality opinion, Trop v. Dulles, sounds the same theme.40
At issue in that case, whether stripping a wartime deserter of citizenship 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.”  
“The basic concept underlying the . . . Amendment,” the opinion observed, 
“is nothing less than the dignity of man.”41  Therefore the constitutional text 
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”42  In that regard, the plurality reported:  
“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that stateless-
ness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”43
A fairly recent example of frozen-in-time interpretation is Grupo Mexi-
cano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., a 1999 decision involv-
ing no grand constitutional question, simply equity between parties with no 
ideological score to settle.44  The basic scenario: A Mexican company de-
faulted on payments due to a U.S. creditor and was sued in a Federal Dis-
trict Court, which had personal jurisdiction over the debtor.  Sliding into 
insolvency, the Mexican company was busily distributing what remained of 
its assets to its Mexican creditors.  It did so in clear violation of a contrac-
tual promise to treat the U.S. creditor on par with all other unsecured, un-
subordinated creditors.  Continuation of that activity would leave nothing in 
the till for the U.S. creditor.  
Since 1975, British courts have been providing a remedy in similar cir-
cumstances.  To assure that there will be assets against which a final judg-
ment for the plaintiff creditor can be executed, courts in this country issued 
Mareva injunctions, named after a decision of the Court of Appeal by Lord 
Denning, M. R., approving the practice.45  A Mareva injunction temporarily 
restrains a foreign debtor from transferring assets pending adjudication of 
the domestic creditor’s claim. 
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A U.S. District Court, ruling over two decades after the leading U.K. 
decisions, looked to the Mareva injunction, which other common-law na-
tions had by then adopted, and found it altogether fitting for the U.S. credi-
tor’s case against the Mexican debtor.  The Court of Appeals agreed.  But a 
5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Mareva injunctions 
were not “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at the time the Consti-
tution was adopted.46  A power that English courts of equity “did not actu-
ally exercise . . . until 1975,” the Court concluded, was not one U.S. courts 
could assume without congressional authorization.47
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, I dissented from the 
Court’s static conception of equitable remedial authority.  Earlier decisions 
described that authority as supple, adaptable to changing conditions.  I 
noted, among other things, that federal courts, in their sometimes heroic 
efforts to implement the public school desegregation mandated by Brown v.
Board of Education, did not embrace a frozen-in-time view of their equita-
ble authority.  Issuing decrees “beyond the contemplation of the 18th-
century Chancellor,”48 they applied the enduring principles of equity to the 
changing needs of a society still in the process of achieving “a more perfect 
Union.”
In Brown, I might note, apropos the respect due opinions of human-
kind, the Attorney General of the United States filed an amicus brief stress-
ing the international importance of the case.  The brief included a letter 
from then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson.  Acheson observed: 
[T]he continuance of racial discrimination in the United States re-
mains a source of constant embarrassment to this Government in the 
day-to-day conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeopardizes the ef-
fective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democ-
ratic nations of the world.49
Turning from frozen-in-time interpretation, I will take up another 
shortfall or insularity in current U.S. jurisprudence, at least as I see it.  The 
Bill of Rights, few would disagree, is the hallmark and pride of the United 
States.  One might therefore assume that it guides and controls U.S. offi-
cialdom wherever in the world they carry the flag of the United States or 
their credentials.  But that is not the currently prevailing view.  For exam-
ple, absent an express ban by treaty, a U.S. officer may abduct a foreigner 
and forcibly transport him to the United States to stand trial.  The Court so 
46
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held, 6-to-3, in 1992.50  Just a year earlier, South Africa’s Supreme Court of 
Appeal had ruled the other way.  It determined that under South Africa’s 
common law, a trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a case against a defen-
dant when the State had acted lawlessly in apprehending him by participat-
ing in an abduction across international borders.51
Another example, one in which I was a participant, involving civil liti-
gation:  Interpreting U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a divided U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held in 1989, during my tenure on that court, 
that foreign plaintiffs acting abroad—plaintiffs were Indian family planning 
organizations—had no First Amendment rights, and therefore no standing 
to assert a violation of such rights by U.S. officials.52  In particular, the In-
dian organizations complained of a condition on U.S. grant money: the re-
cipients could not engage in any abortion counseling, even in a separate 
entity and with funds from other sources.  In dissent, I resisted the notion 
that in an encounter between the United States and nonresident aliens, “the 
amendment we prize as ‘first’ has no force in court.”53  I expressed the ex-
pectation that the position taken in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions would one day accurately describe our law.  “[W]herever the United 
States acts,” the Restatement projects, “‘it can only act in accordance with 
the limitations imposed by the Constitution.’”54
That point was well stated by Columbia University Professor Louis 
Henkin, a principal drafter of the current Foreign Relations Restatement, 
former president of the American Society of International Law, and Editor 
of the Society’s journal.  Henkin wrote: 
[I]n a world of states, the United States is not in a position to secure 
the rights of all individuals everywhere, [but] it is always in a position 
to respect them.  Our federal government must not invade the individ-
ual rights of any human being.  The choice in the Bill of Rights of the 
word “person” rather than “citizen” was not fortuitous; nor was the 
absence of a geographical limitation.  Both reflect a commitment to 
respect the individual rights of all human beings.55
Returning to my main theme, I will recount chronologically the Su-
preme Court’s most recent decisions involving foreign or international legal 
sources as an aid to the resolution of constitutional questions.  In a headline 
2002 decision, Atkins v. Virginia, a six-member majority (all save Chief 
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas) held unconstitutional the 
execution of a mentally retarded offender.56  The Court noted that “within 
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes com-
mitted by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”57
The following 2002–2003 Term was appraised as pathmarking.  New York 
Times reporter Linda Greenhouse observed on July 1, 2003, in her annual 
roundup of the Supreme Court’s decisions:  The Court has “displayed a 
[steadily growing] attentiveness to legal developments in the rest of the 
world and to the [C]ourt’s role in keeping the United States in step with 
them.”58
Among examples, I would include the Michigan University affirma-
tive action cases decided June 23, 2003.59  In separate opinions, joined in 
one case by Justice Breyer, in the other in full by Justice Souter and in part 
by Justice Breyer, I looked to two United Nations Conventions: the 1965 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, which the United States has ratified; and the 1979 Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which, 
sadly, the United States has not yet ratified.  Both Conventions distinguish 
between impermissible policies of oppression or exclusion, and permissible 
policies of inclusion, “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de 
facto equality.”60  The Court’s decision in the Michigan Law School case, I 
observed, “accords with the international understanding of the [purpose and 
propriety] of affirmative action.”61
A better indicator from the same Term, because it attracted a majority, 
is Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, announced 
June 26, 2003.62  Overruling the Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, Lawrence declared unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting two 
adult persons of the same sex from engaging, voluntarily, in intimate sexual 
conduct.  On the question of dynamic versus static, frozen-in-time constitu-
tional interpretation, the Court’s opinion instructs: 
     Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the com-
ponents of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have 
been more specific.  They did not presume to have this insight.  
They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations 
56
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can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve 
only to oppress.  As the Constitution endures, persons in every gen-
eration can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.63
On respect for “the Opinions of [Human]kind,” the Lawrence Court empha-
sized: “The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an 
integral part of human freedom in many other countries.”64  In support, the 
Court cited the leading 1981 European Court of Human Rights decision, 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, and subsequent European Human Rights 
Court decisions affirming the protected right of homosexual adults to en-
gage in intimate, consensual conduct. 
In the 2003–2004 Term, foreign and international legal sources again 
figured in several decisions.  These included, most notably, two June 2004 
decisions.  One, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, concerned a U.S. citizen, held incom-
municado in a Navy brig in South Carolina pursuant to an executive decree 
declaring him an “enemy combatant.”65  Ruling some six months before the 
Lords’ decision in the Belmarsh case, the Court held, 8-to-1, that the peti-
tioner was entitled, at least, to a fair opportunity to contest the factual basis 
for his detention.  Even in “our most challenging and uncertain moments” 
when “our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested,” 
Justice O’Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality, “we must preserve our 
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”66
“[H]istory and common sense,” she reminded, “teach us that an unchecked 
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression 
and abuse . . .”67  That point received eloquent statement in Lord Hoffman’s 
opinion in the Belmarsh case. 
The other “enemy combatant” case, Rasul v. Bush, held that U.S. 
courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the deten-
tion of foreign nationals captured in hostilities abroad, then transported to 
the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.68  Lord Steyn, before this 
decision, called Guantánamo a “legal black hole.”69  The Supreme Court has 
so far written only chapter one on the Guantánamo Bay incarcerations.  
Federal district court judges have split on chapter two.  One judge held that 
foreigners detained at Guantánamo Bay, though they had access to court, 
could gain no judicial relief.70  Another ruled that the detainees were enti-
63
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tled to a fair hearing on the question whether their incarceration meets due 
process demands.71  Both cases are currently on appeal.   
The Supreme Court’s March 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons pre-
sents perhaps the fullest expressions to date on the propriety and utility of 
looking to “the opinions of [human]kind.”72  Holding unconstitutional the 
execution of persons under the age of 18 when they committed capital 
crimes, the Court declared it fitting to acknowledge “the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty . . . .”73
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that “[t]he opinion of the world com-
munity . . . provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”74  “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution,” he ex-
plained, to recognize “the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights 
by other nations and peoples . . . .”75
The Roper opinion pointed, specifically, to the United Kingdom’s abo-
lition of the juvenile death penalty over 50 years ago.  The U.K.’s “experi-
ence bears particular relevance,” Justice Kennedy noted, “in light of the 
historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s 
own origins . . . in the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 . . . .”76
Justice O’Connor, although she dissented from the Court’s categorical 
ruling, agreed with the Court on the relevance of “foreign and international 
law to [an] assessment of evolving standards of decency.”77  The other dis-
senters, for whom Justice Scalia spoke, vigorously contended that foreign 
and international law have no place in determining what punishments are 
“cruel and unusual” within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment.78
Recognizing that forecasts are risky, I nonetheless believe we will con-
tinue to accord “a decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind” as a 
matter of comity and in a spirit of humility.  Comity, because projects vital 
to our well being—combating international terrorism is a prime example—
require trust and cooperation of nations the world over.  And humility be-
cause, in Justice O’Connor’s words: “Other legal systems continue to inno-
vate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal problems 
that arise each day, from which we can learn and benefit.”79
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In this regard, I was impressed by an observation made in September 
2003 by Israel’s Chief Justice Barak.  September 11, he noted, confronts the 
United States with the dilemma of conducting a war on terrorism without 
sacrificing the nation’s most cherished values, including our respect for 
human dignity.  “We in Israel,” Barak said, “have our September 11, and 
September 12 and so on.”80  He spoke of his own Court’s efforts to balance 
the government’s no doubt compelling need to secure the safety of the State 
and of its citizens on the one hand, and the nation’s high regard for “human 
dignity and freedom on the other hand.”  He referred, particularly, to a 
question presented to his Court: “Is it lawful to use violence (less euphemis-
tically, torture) in interrogat[ing] [a] terrorist in a ‘ticking bomb’ situation.”  
His Court’s answer: No, “[n]ever use violence.”  He elaborated: 
[It] is the fate of a democracy [that] not all means are acceptable to it, 
. . . not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it.  Some-
times, a democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back.  
Nonetheless, it has the upper hand.  Preserving the rule of law and 
recognition of individual liberties constitute an important component 
of [a democracy’s] understanding of security.  At the end of the day, 
[those values buoy up] its spirit and strength [and its capacity to] 
overcome [the] difficulties.81
Lord Hoffman spoke to the same effect in his December 16, 2004, 
opinion.  He concluded:  
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living 
in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not 
from terrorism but from laws such as [section 23 of the 2001 Antiter-
rorism, Crime & Security Act, authorizing indefinite imprisonment 
without charge or trial].  That is the true measure of what terrorism 
may achieve.82
He hoped, after the Lords of Appeal ruling, Parliament would not “give the 
terrorists such a victory.”83  Parliament, you no doubt know, reacted swiftly 
to the Lords’ decision by enacting in March a measure allowing placement 
of terrorist suspects under a highly restrictive form of house arrest, in lieu 
of imprisonment, again without charging or trying them. 
We live in an age in which the fundamental principles to which we 
subscribe—liberty, equality, and justice for all—are encountering extraordi-
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nary challenges.  But it is also an age in which we can join hands with oth-
ers who hold to those principles and face similar challenges.  May we draw 
inspiration from Abigail Adams, who wrote to her son, the future President, 
of the era in which he was coming of age:  
These are the times in which a genius would wish to live.  It is not 
in the still calm of life, or the repose of a pacific station, that great 
characters are formed.  The habits of a vigorous mind are formed in 
contending with difficulties.84
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